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The several types of legislative restriction on freedom in pricing, including the
Robinson-Patman Act, state "fair trade" (resale price maintenance) acts, and various
laws actual and proposed to prevent selling below cost, and to restrict or prevent the
use of so-called loss leaders in retail selling, all have a common social ancestry. They
stem broadly from the sentiment for protecting the small merchant against his larger
competitors. They belong, in other words, to the same family as the discriminatory
chain store tax measures. In an era when security is the watchword, these laws
represent the determined drive of certain groups of retailers and wholesalers to
improve their economic position and make it secure against the stresses of com-
petition.1 There are, of course, other strains in the ancestry of these measures, but
the urge to obtain security for the little fellow is the predominant one.
The average business man, unless he belongs to a group benefited by these laws,
is likely to characterize all these restrictions on his pricing freedom as governmental
interference and regimentation, objectionable outgrowths of the New Deal. Actually,
however, these particular developments are quite alien from one aspect of the New
Deal, namely, the trend towards economic planning and state socialism, as exempli-
fied, for instance, in the Tugwellian philosophy. The thoughts of the economic
planners run more in the direction of permitting the development of large businesses
to the point where the state can assume control of key production and distribution
industries without having to direct the destinies of hundreds of thousands of small
enterprises. But the Robinson-Patman Act was not fundamentally a New Deal
measure. In fact the sentiment which fathered this Act and its various blood
relatives has in it more that is reminiscent of the beginnings of the Nazi movement
in Germany, where the same zeal was displayed to protect the small business man
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'This purpose is amply revealed by such statements as that of Representative Patman, speaking at the
annual convention of the United Independent Grocers and Food Dealers Association in New York on April
11, 1937: "Chain stores are out. There is no place for chain stores in the American economic picture."
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from his large competitors. Ultimately, perhaps, both roads may lead to the total-
itarian state; but at the outset they fork in different directions.
Such speculations take one far afield. Possibly a more realistic observation would
be to this effect: government having to an increasing extent abandoned its impartial
r^le of umpire in favor of one of partisan interference, small retailers, aware of the
tariff favors bestowed on manufacturers in previous years and more recently observ-
ing the benefits distributed to farmers, have now organized themselves to exert
pressure with a view to making their own economic position more comfortable. Of
course it goes without saying that all these seekers of advantage march boldly for-
ward with good conscience under the banners of public welfare.
These various legislative measures attack the pricing problem in two places. One
approach is the regulation of pricing practices as between business sellers and buyers
in wholesale markets. The other approach is the regulation of pricing from the
retail selling end. The first of these approaches has resulted in the Robinson-Patman
Act. The proponents of this measure, skilfully taking advantage of the sentiment
in Congress against monopolies, used the monopoly argument (although as applied
to retailing it will not bear careful examination) as a stalking-horse and thereby
succeeded in attaching the Robinson-Patman Act to the Clayton Act, where it does
not belong.2 The other approach, the regulation of retail selling prices, has taken
two avenues: (I) extension of the resale price maintenance privilege to owners
of trademarks by means of "fair trade" acts now on the statute books of 3o-odd
states and (2) the prohibition, either by state law or by trade practice agreement, of
selling below cost.' The California Unfair Practices Act,4 for instance, a practical
'See Learned and Isaacs, The Robinson-Patman Law: Some Assumptions and Expectations (Winter,
1937) z5 HAzv. Bus. Rav. 137.
A price differential becomes a discrimination when it is made between parties who are in such cir-
cumstances and have such common interests as to be entitled to equal treatment, for instance, manufac-
turers or merchants who compete with one another in the direct or indirect resale of particular goods.
The price discriminations which are outlawed by this Act (unless they can take refuge under some of the
enumerated defenses) are those made between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and
quality in interstate commerce "where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen com-
petition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition
with any person who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such discrimination, or the,
customers of either of them . . . " Robinson-Patman Act, § x(a).
The important phraseology here added to that of the Clayton Act is that italicized above. As Pro-
fessors Learned and Isaacs point out, "Here we have obviously departed from the old philosophy and
tried to save men from the ravages of competition. But once more the draftsmen of the Act have been
very adroit. They do not condemn in words the injury of certain competitors. They still talk as if the
thing condemned is injury to competition. It is unlawful to engage in price discrimination . . . the
effect of which may be to injure, destroy, or prevent competition- with certain persons. What is the
difference between hurting the corner grocer as an incident of competition with the chain and hurting his
competition with the chain? If the corner grocer must lop five cents off the marked price of a can of
peas to meet competition, he is hurt, but is his competition hurt within the meaning of the statute? If
the answer is 'yes,' then the wording of the statute is grossly misleading. It is an anti-competition statute
slipped into the anti-trust laws. And since it stops competition at the level where it is most effective in
American business, the only level where aggressive buying makes inroads on fixed prices, it amounts to a
repeal of the anti-trust policy in a very important part of American business." Learned and Isaacs, supra,
at p. 139.
'Such restrictions apply both to manufacturers and to distributors, but apparently are aimed principally
at retail distribution. 'Cal. Stat. 1935, pp. 1546-155.
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duplicate of which is now on the statute books of at least five other states, provides
that it shall be unlawful to sell below cost, this term as applied to distribution cost
to mean invoice or replacement cost plus the particular distributor's cost of doing
business, defined to comprise labor (including salaries), rent, interest, depreciation,
selling expense, maintenance, delivery, credit losses, licenses, taxes, insurance, and
advertising. Virtually similar provisions are found also in the Trade Practice Rules
for the Rubber Tire Industry promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission. Other
legislative remedies, less drastic in character, contemplate prohibition of sales either
below invoice cost or below invoice cost plus some stated percentage, such as 6%.
Proposals along these lines have been endorsed, in fact, by such organizations as the
National Retail Dry Goods Association and the Associated Grocery Manufacturers
of America.
Although there is a common social sentiment behind all these measures and
although. they have been sponsored and pressed for enactment by substantially the
same business groups,5 the logic of laws giving owners of trade-marks the privilege
of resale price maintenance is quite clearly a different logic from that which runs
through all these other laws and proposals. It is a logic which disregards costs (in-
deed one of the chief arguments against price maintenance is the fact that it takes
no account of differences in the cost of distribution), whereas the logic of the
Robinson-Patman Act and of such measures as the California Unfair Practices ACt
rests very largely on costs; costs are taken as the criterion of fairness or unfairness.
This emphasis on costs is understandable. The notion that price should typically
be based on cost plus a fair profit is quite thoroughly ingrained in the minds of
many business men. Although from a strict economic standpoint there is no reason
why price differentials should not be as readily explainable by factors on the demand
side of the equation as by factors on the supply side, the business man not infre-
quently seems to have some sense of guilt about selling at a price which cannot be
"justified" on an ordinary accounting basis; and the same feeling that price differen-
tials ought always to be explainable in terms of costs undoubtedly is a natural one
on the part of the buyer who fails to receive as low a price as .his competitor. Some
of the responsibility for the prevalence of this point of view attaches also to the
marketing experts who have steadily urged the virtues of price stability and long-
run "scientific" price policies. Observing the general success of the one-price, non-
higgling policy in retail business, these authorities have advocated a similar policy
to govern dealings in wholesale markets. Accountants must also share in the
responsibility, because of the importance which many of them have attached to cost
accounting as a major basis for price determination. Both the marketing experts
and the accountants, of course, have been substantially aided and abetted by trade
association executives in the promulgation of these ideas. It is therefore not sur-
prising that even prior to the N.R.A. the very term "pricq cutting" carried with it a
'Cf. Grether, Solidarity in the Disrbutive Trades in Relation to the Control of Price Competition,
infra, p. 375. ED.
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connotation of opprobrium, and that in the enthusiasm of the early N.R.A. period
a view gained wide acceptance to the effect that the unfair practice of selling below
cost was retarding recovery, that "price cutters" and "chiselers" made it difficult, if
not impossible, for honest men to do business at a fair profit.
Actually the doctrine that the only fair prices are those which are based on costs,
and that price differentials which cannot be justified in terms of costs are therefore
unjustly discriminatory, is bad economics and impossible accounting. It is essentially
a denial of the economic function of price; it leaves pricing a one-sided matter, with
the price-making function largely in the hands of the seller, and the edge removed
from the demand blade of the pricing scissors. Developments in the direction of re-
quiring that the prices of particular goods be based on average accounting costs for
the period are, on the whole, conducive to something less than full employment and
to failure effectively to explore the potentialities of elasticity in lower strata of de-
mand; for numerous situations exist where there is unused plant capacity or where
industries are subject to decreasing costs, and where consequently a discriminatory
price policy makes possible larger output and larger employment. (This principle
is, of course, well understood in the public utility business.)
There is also the point that seller-administered prices are conducive to price
rigidity. Logically, perhaps, there is no need that this should be the case, no neces-
sary conflict between that form of price stability represented by an administered,
one-price policy and the desirable degree of price flexibility to accommodate changing
business conditions. In theory a manufacturer maintaining close touch with his
market ought to be able to effect the necessary changes in his own price schedule
without at any time indulging in price discrimination. Practically it does not work
out that way. A manufacturer who has developed a one-price policy is usually very
loath to change his price.' He necessarily is taking a rather long-run view of the
situation; and so he insulates himself to a considerable degree from the impact of
market forces, believing that he can maximize his profits over a period by adhering
to his established price. Keeping the price unchanged is the path of least resistance.
It avoids potentially troublesome adjustments with wholesalers and retailers with
respect to stocks of goods already in hand. It avoids also any difficulty which might
be encountered in raising prices later in ihe event of a change in market conditions.
Manufacturers frequently hesitate to make downward price changes for fear of
"spoiling the market" in case demand proves to be inelastic, and they commonly do
not differentiate between a change in relative prices and an adjustment to a changing
price level. At best there are many factors which are likely to retard price changes,
and as a practical matter these-factors are strongly reinforced by a one-price policy.
As abundantly demonstrated during the depression, there are numerous manufac-
turers who will resort to many expedients before they will change prices; they will
even in some instances reduce production and lay off labor first. This kind of price
policy is already far too prevalent among American business men; and the Robinson-
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Patman Act and other fair trade laws, with their emphasis on cost as the criterion
of fairness and their consequent encouragement of one-price policies, promise to
make a bad matter worse. American business has already worshipped too long at
the shrine of price stability.
'It is frequently inquired why, if the one-price system, that is, the same price to
all comers, with no higgling, works so admirably in retail business in America it
would not be similarly advantageous to place wholesale prices on the same basis.
Superficially, the analogy seems to be good; but there are vital differences. For
one thing, consumers are not actuated by the profit motive; they are not buying for
resale. Also, consumers patronizing any particular retail store for the most part
stand on a fairly similar basis as to quantities, services required, and the facilitating
functions which they themselves are prepared to perform. But among customers of
a wholesaler or manufacturer such a similarity is not to be found; it is probably less
likely to be found today, with the evolutionary changes that have taken place in the
system of distribution, than it was 40 or 50 years ago. Again, the technical ability
of consumers to look out for themselves is by no means comparable to that of com-
mercial buyers; the admonition "caveat emptor" has properly fallen into disuse in
enlightened retail circles. Furthermore the one-price system of retailing prevails
principally for goods on which the potential saving that a .consumer can obtain by
higgling is, on the whole, not worth the time required; but in the case of con-
sumers' goods of high unit value, automobiles, for instance, where the potential
saving bulks larger, the practice of higgling still rules, in the form of shopping for
the best trade-in allowance. Price is essentially two-sided; there are two sets of
motives and two sets of calculations. Price is what the market will pay and what
the seller will accept. In a great majority of retail transactions, particularly the
small ones, this two-sided character of price is waived by mutual consent; but this
fact does not mean that we can safely dispense with the process of bargaining in the
whole economic structure. When consumers waive the bargaining privilege, they
in effect commission retailers to do their bargaining for them. Hence the substantial
elimination of individual bargaining in retail trade is a fact which strengthens rather
than lessens the need for bargaining as between retailers and their suppliers.
There is also grave difficulty from an accourIting standpoint in making costs the
criteria of fairness or unfairness in-pricing. Even the manufacturing costs of a
particular commodity, especially one produced in conjunction with other items, do
not have by any means the precision and validity which legislators seem to suppose;
and when it comes to distribution costs, the allocation of overhead items to particular
products is largely meaningless. Even if distribution cost accounting were not in
its present rudimentary state, the expense of the record-keeping necessary to enable
a wholesale grocer, for instance, to determine with any approach to accuracy the
cost of handling the XYZ brand of canned peaches might easily be prohibitive. The
numerous and varied interrelations of commodities from a sales standpoint, and the
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large proportion of the distributor's expense which is overhead in character, i.e., not
incurred directly and solely in the purchase, storage, handling, and sale of any one
particular commodity, make itemized distribution cost accounting largely a fallacious
procedure. Essentially a merchant's profit is derived from his whole output of sales
over a period; it is his total dollar gross margin on that output less his total dollar
expense for the period. To endeavor to regard net profit as a sum total 'made up of
individually calculated net profits, over and above allocated costs, on each item or
line of merchandise handled, is repugnant both to good economics and to good
management.
Aside from these economic and accounting difficulties, of which this brief men-
tion has been made, there is another serious objection to a program of legislative
reform of trade practices which tends in the direction of outlawing price differentials
not based on ascertainable differences in costs. This objection, which applies par-
ticularly to the Robinson-Patman Act, grows out of the great variety of marketing
functions and the constant shift and change in the grouping of those functions; and
it is with this part of the problem of costs that this paper is particularly coficerned.
It is no longer possible to take a simple institutional view of the marketdng field.
Any marketing text book today which proceeded merely to describe and define the
principal institutions engaged in distribution, such as the manufacturer's sales or-
ganization, the broker, the wholesaler, and the retailer, and to assign definite groups
of functions to each of these would, if it went no further, be dangerously unrealistic.
Indeed, there probably never has been a time when such a purely static view would
have been adequate; but at a somewhat earlier period in the nation's history it was
more nearly true than it is today that a certain group of functions belonged rather
definitely to the manufacturer, another group to the wholesaler, and still another to
the retailer. The manufacturer, for instance, determined what was to be made,
designed the product, owned the trade mark, manufactured the goods, advertised
them to consumers or to members of the trade, and employed salesmen to sell the
goods to wholesalers. Wholesalers bought goods in large quantities, usually from a
number of manufacturers, carried stocks from which to fill orders, and sent out a
salesforce to solicit business from retailers. Retailers, in turn, bought in smaller
quantities from a number of wholesalers, maintained a variety of goods for selection,
arranged them in suitable displays, perhaps advertised to consumers, and employed
salespeople to stand behind the counters and wait on customers.
This'very elementary picture never was wholly true even in the horse and buggy
days; but certainly in the years before i91o it came somewhat nearer to being 'an
adequate representation of the state of affairs than it does today; and, unfortunately,
the pseudo-simplicity of this A B C marketing structure seems to have commended
it, in the minds of many people, as the suitable and appropriate arrangement, any
deviations from which are to be discouraged.
Obviously one major break in this simplified structure occurred when some
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manufacturers, dissatisfied with the services of the existing wholesale middlemen,
themselves undertook the performance of wholesale functions, sending out a sub-
stantially augmented salesforce to sell directly to retailers in small quantities, and
arranging to carry stocks of finished goods for immediate delivery either at the fac-
tory or in branch warehouses. Naturally these manufacturers sold to retailers at
prices higher than those at which they formerly had sold to wholesalers, in order
to cover the costs of the additional functions which they had assumed. Another
break in the traditional institutional picture of marketing came when some whole-
salers began to use private brands. With respect to goods sold under these brands
they were assuming the merchandising function: they owned the brand; they did
the advertising; they laid down the specifications for the product, buying, perhaps,
from a number of different manufacturing sources; and they assumed the respon-
sibility for the quality of the goods. Here also the costs shifted along with the
functions; the wholesaler selling under a private brand naturally paid lower prices,
since the manufacturer was released from the advertising and other costs which the
wholesaler had to assume by virtue of his private 'brand policy.
Even more important than the development of private brands by wholesalers has
been the assumption of a number of wholesale functions by various types of retailers.
Consider the difference" between the position of the small neighborhood store and
that of the large department store or chain. The proprietor of the small store buys
to a considerable extent from wholesalers; but whether he buys from wholesalers or
manufacturers, it is characteristically the case that the vendors come to him, rather
than that he goes to them. The regular salesmen of manufacturers and wholesalers,
the window dressers, the truck delivery men, all come to the stores. The proprietor
need scarcely stir from his establishment to look over the complete range of merchan-
dise which he might conceivably offer his customers. This situation is in marked
contrast to that of the large department store, for instance, sending its buyers at
regular and frequent intervals to visit the important markets, not alone in the
United States but throughout the world. The big retailer typically goes to the
vendors, many of whose marketing functions are thereby performed in a reverse
manner, so to speak. When manufacturers or other vendors deal in this way with
their customers, they have relatively small selling expenses. Instead, the customers
have large buying expenses. In the one instance the cost of certain marketing func-
tions is a vendor's selling expense, and consequently appears as part of the cost of
goods to the retailer; whereas in the other instance the cost of the equivalent market-
ing functions appears as part of the retailer's expense of doing business.
This reaching out by the large retailer to embrace in his scope of action a wider
sector of the marketing task is particularly well illustrated by the operations of large
grocery chains. These concerns are essentially combination retailer-wholesalers; they
have integrated the retailing and Wholesaling functions.6  They buy 9o% or more
OFor instance, the U. S. Census for 1930 makes the following statement: "Stores are only a part of
the activity of chains. . . .Chains combine in the one organization the function of wholesale and retail
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immediately from manufacturers and other direct sources and their agents;7 take
deliveries, frequently in carload lots, in their own warehouses; break bulk; carry
on packaging operations; ship assorted smaller quantities by truck to several hun-
dred of their own stores on requisition from store managers; advertise to consumers
through a variety of media; apply their own brands to many products; maintain
effective direction and control of store managers by means of an elaborate brganiza-
tion of supervisors and superintendents; and frequently conduct such manufactur-
ing operations as baking bread or roasting coffee. Their warehouses and merchan-
dise distribution systems on the physical side, their organization of supervisors and
superintendents on the personnel side, and their private brands and advertising on
the promotional side-all these clearly are the counterpart of the wholesaler.
Although formerly the institutional labels "wholesaler" and "retailer" may have
carried with them the connotation of certain groups of functions, at the present time
any merely institutional view of the marketing procedure is wholly inadequate to
bring into perspective such an integration of distribution functions as is represented,
for instance, by the operations of the J. C. Penney Company in buying cotton in
large quantities, laying down specifications for the goods to be manufactured, having
the manufacturing done on a contract basis, affixing its own brand name, and
promoting the sale of the goods through some 1,4oo of its own stores.
It is in this integration of the marketing tasks that some of the principal oppor-
tunities for economy in distribution are to be found. When salesmen for a number
of competing wholesalers are calling on small retail outlets throughout a territory,
each crossing and recrossing the other's tracks, and many of them taking small
orders from the same concerns, there is obvious lost motion and waste of man power.
Contrast this situation with that of a chain: the store managers draw all their
merchandise from a single source; the quantities delivered at a single time are
substantial; the tasks of ordering goods, supervising stocks, checking displays, and
so on, are regularized to reduce lost motion to a minimum; supervisors, superin-
tendents, and traveling auditors have their appointed tasks; and all goes forward
according to routine. It is principally because these dual functions of the wholesaler
and the retailer can be accomplished at lower costs when combined in a single or-
ganization that chain stores can sell at lower prices, even after the difference in
services rendered, such as credit and delivery, is taken into account.
To illustrate, the following figures, based principally on reports of the Census of
American Business: r933,s show that consumers can realize a saving of approxi-
mately 15 cents out of the sales dollar by patronizing chain drug stores rather than
independent drug stores.
distribution" U. S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 15TH CENSUS, CENSUS OF DisrRmiuToN, Retail Chains
(1933) 8-9.
'Fed. Trade Comm'n, Chain Stores: Sources of Chain-Store Merchandise, SEN. Doc. No. 30, 72d
Cong., Ist Sess. (1932) 15.
'U. S. BUREAU oF THE CENSUS, CENSUS oF AMERMCAN BusiNEss: 1933. It is recognized that the
expense data in the Census are quite far from being fully satisfactory. There are other surveys which
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Consumer Saving by Chain Distribution in the Drug Field
$x .00AI.O
12 cents
54 cents WHOLE- 34 cents
MANUFACTURER SALER INDEPENDENT RETAILER
Costs, Selling Expense, and Profit Expenses Expenses and Profit& Profit
85 cents
54 cents 31 cents 1
CONSUMER
"ANUFACoURER CHAN SAVING






51.oo Consumer's dollar spent at independent retail drug store
Expense of operating independent drug store9
Profit1 o
.34 Independent retailer's expenses and profit
$ .66 Wholesaler's price to retailer
'Wholesaler's expense of doing business 1 '
Profit 12
.12 Wholesaler's expenses and profit
$ .54 Manufacturer's selling price (Cost of production, plus
selling expense, plus profit)
Assuming that chain buys same product from manufacturer at same price:
Add
$ .54 Cost of goods to chain
.31 Expenses and profit of chain'"
$ .85 Chain's price to consumer14
afford more reliable figures for selected samples in particular years, but figures from these sources for all
three types of distributors, namely, wholesale druggists, independent retail druggists, and chain drug stores,
are not available for any one recent year. The comparison here shown also is likely to be somewhat more
conservative, that is, less favorable to chains, because of the probability that errors in the Census data
tend to cause understatement of the independent retaile's expenses.
"Total operating expense for independent. drug stores in 1933 = $31.80 per $Soo of sales. See U. S.
BUREAu oF TH CENSUS, CENSUS oF Aawmc x BusiNEss: 1933, Retail Distribution: Drug Retailing (May,
'935) 9.
Estimate of 2% profit based on several private surveys.
XTotal expenses of wholesalers of drugs and drug sundries in 1933 =- 17.3% of sales. See U. S.
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These figures show that in situations where chains buy directly from manufac-
turers and combine the wholesale and retail functions under one overhead it is pos-
sible for a substantial saving to be effected. This illustration, furthermore, does not
take into account the probable saving in selling expense which the manufacturer
may realize through dealing directly with a large chain. That the theoretical saving
arrived at by the above calculations is in no sense an exaggeration is attested by such
studies as that described in the final report of the Federal Trade Commission on the
Chain-Store Investigation, in which it is stated with reference to retail drug prices
that "the geometric average of chain and independent prices, when weighted by
chain and when weighted by independent volume, indicates that the prices of inde-
pendents are from 14.527 percent (Detroit) to 22.72 percent (Washington) higher
than those of the chains in the four cities studied by the Commission. ..."15
Integration of functions rather than large buying power is the principal source
of chain store economies. The fact that the wholesale function when combined
with the retailing job can be performed at a much lower cost is definitely indicated
by the findings of the Census of American Business: 1933, again relating to the
drug trade. The costs of operating the central office and warehouses of chain drug
companies were stated to be $3.30 per $ioo of sales, 6 whereas the operating costs
of wholesale institutions handling drugs and drug sundries were found to be
$17.30 per $Ioo of sales.' 7
A broadly similar line of reasoning applies to advertising allowances. The closely
knit organization of a chain not infrequently can accomplish certain parts of the
sales promotion function more economically than can a manufacturer. It has long
been recognized that consumer advertising loses greatly in effectiveness unless it is
Isupplemented by advertising, display, and promotion at the point of sale. Hence
many manufacturers make large expenditures for dealer helps, displays, circulars,
BUREAU OF TSHE CENSUS, CENSUS OF AMERicAN BUSINESS: 1933, Final United States Summary of Wholesale
Trade in 1933 (Nov., x934), Table 2A, p. 8. If wholesaler's sales are 66 cents, 17.3% = ii cents.
"Conservative estimate, based on common figure for net profit of x.3% of sales (over and above
interest on investment) for 129 firms in 1924. See HARVARD UNIV. BUREAU OF BUSINESS RESEARCH, BULL.
No. 50, Operating Expenses in the Wholesale Drug Business in 1924 (1925).
', Costs for chain drug stores with fountains in 1933 = $32.o6 per $Sioo of sales. U. S. BUREAU OF THE
CENsus, op. cit. supra note 9, at 9. Profit estimated at 4%. (Net gain of 34 chains reporting to Harvard
University Bureau of Business Research= 2.65% of sales in 1932. See BUREAU BULL. No. 94, Chain
Store Expenses and Profits: An Interim Report for 1932 (934), Table 13, p. 20). Gross Margin (32% +
4%) = 36% -f retail sales equivalent to 56.3% on cost. On a cost of 54 cents, this equals 30.5 cents.
"Final figures for the Census of 1935 are not as yet available in sufficient detail to permit a precisely_
similar computation for the later year. A rough calculation of the same general type based on the
Census figures for 1935 (in which an allowance for proprietor's salary is the chief element omitted), but
using 4% of net sales as the estimated profit both of independent drug stores and of chains, indicates a
chain selling price in 1935 of approximately 88 cents for goods sold through independent drug stores at St.
'Federal Trade Comm'n, Chain Stores: Final Report on the Chain-Store Investigation, SEN. Doc.
No. 4, 74th Cong., ist Sess. (1935) 31.
"
8U. S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CENSUS OF AMERIcAN BUSINESS: 1933, Retail Distribution: Drug
Retailing (May, 1935) 13.
"U. S. BuREAu oF THE CENSUS, op. cit. supra note i , at 8.
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window-trims, and so on. When such efforts are applied to a large number of inde-
pendent retailers, however, there is much lost motion; and it was early discovered
that a chain can utilize its own supervisory and promotional organization, its adver-
tising copy, hand bills, displays, window-trims, bulletins to managers, and so on,
to accomplish the same results more effectively and at a lower cost than a manufac-
turer could do it for himself. Recognition of this fact has led some manufacturers
to relinquish part of their promotional functions to chains, a price differential nat-
urally resulting. In other words, in the case of chains and some other large-scale
retailers there clearly exists an economic basis for bona fide advertising allowances.
(This is" not to assert, of course, that all advertising allowances are bona fide in
character.)
Some shifting of functions also has occurred with respect to brokerage. The
broker's task is a genuine marketing function, that of establishing contact between
buyers and sellers. In some lines of business, textiles, for instance, the brokerage
function commonly is performed by independent concerns having no regular or
permanent affiliations either with buyers or with sellers. In other fields, notably the
food trades,* the broker is essentially a manufacturer's sales representative having
close relationships with a number of manufacturers whom he serves by finding
customers. In these same trades the opposite situation also is to be observed, where
the brokerage function is integrated with the buying side, the broker's job then
being that of seeking out prospective sellers. Since the brokerage function per se is
that of arranging contacts between buyers and sellers, there is no essential reason
why a broker who is part of a chain grocery store organization does not perform
as typical a brokerage function when he establishes contacts with canners who have
a certain grade of fancy canned corn available for delivery as some other broker
regularly retained by these canners might perform in seeking out chains which were
in the market for that particular commodity1 8 Under such circumstances there is
1 A report in the New York Herald Tribune for April 16, 1937, of hearings before the Federal Trade
Commission on charges that the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. and six food packers had violated the
Robinson-Patman Act, through special discounts and allowances in lieu of brokerage, described testimony
in regard to the services rendered to sellers by A. & P. buyers:
"One of the witnesses examined yesterday was J. M. Zoller, field purchasing agent of the A. and P.
Company, with headquarters at Baltimore. His purchases for the company, he testified, amounted to
about $S,ooo,ooo a month, mostly in canned goods, on which formerly he received a brokerage averaging
about 5 per cent. Mr. Zoller was a salaried employee of the A. and P.
"When the Robinson-Patman Act became operative he ceased accepting the brokerage allowances, but,
it is contended by the Federal Trade Commission, the A. and P. continued to benefit in allowance from
sellers in the form of discounts, although they were held in escrow or in abeyance. Mr. Zoller testified
that he ran his office as a brokerage office.
"Another witness was Ralph Polk, head of the Polk Company, Haines City, Fla., growers and
canners of grapefruit, from whie the A. and P. has been a large buyer. Asked by Mr. Feldman [counsel
for the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.] to describe the different type[s] of brokers with whom his
company did business, Mr. Polk said that [one] type was the broker 'with accounts more or less steady'
and another, a broker who had no regular outlet or supply.
"'He is a go-between between producer and buyer,' said Mr. Polk. I have heard a broker say he
didn't know whom he represented. But he has a very legitimate place in the business.'
"A question by Mr. Feldman that met strenuous objection from commission counsel was: 'Are the
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nothing inappropriate in compensation paid by a seller to a broker who is a sub-
sidiary of the buyer. (Again the caveat must be entered that this explanation by no
means guarantees the bona fide character of all brokerage allowances.)
The sum and substance of the matter is that under the stress of competition a
majority of the marketing functions are susceptible of being shifted;- there are
scarcely any of them which can be regarded as. the inalienable property of any par-
ticular marketing institution. Hence any purely institutional view of the marketing
scene is woefully inadequate. Rather than looking simply at institutions, one must
look to see where the functions are performed; and of course the costs go broadly
with the functions.
In all this shifting and realignment of marketing functions and the consequent
changes in the attributes and character of institutions, many manufacturers inevitably
find themselves with a problem of scrambled distribution. Their goods move
through a variety of channels, and there may be little uniformity among the several
patterns of distributive functions performed. For part of his output a manufacturer
may carry on an extensive group of marketing functions; for another part only a
limited group. The Goodyear Company, for instance, sold its own brands of tires
to selected independent tire dealers throughout the United States. It laid down the
specifications, designed the products, advertised them extensively, employed a large
force of salesmen to call on retail dealers, maintained wholesale branches at which
stocks were carried for immediate deliveries, and undertook a broad program of
dealer assistance. These tires were one part of its output; but there was another
part, the tires sold on contract to Sears Roebuck. For these, Sears laid down the
specifications, owned the brand, did all the advertising, assumed responsibility for
the quality, and performed the handling functions through its own warehousing,
mail-order, and store organization. The price differentials in this case, therefore,
were related to differences in functions far more than they were to differences in
quantities.
Some commentators, viewing these scrambled distribution situations, have been
inclined to ascribe them to a mania for volume sales on the part of both manufac-
turers and distributors and have suggested that a wise manufacturer would in gen-
eral adhere to one fixed pattern of distribution and thereby avoid complications.
This clearly is too static a view. It overlooks changes in conditions affecting distri-
bution, the rise of new institutions, and the continual search under competitive
pressure to find more economical groupings of functions, all this taking place
against a background of distribfition costs that are advancing inevitably in response
to the evolution of the industrial and social system. A manufacturer, as a practical
services rendered by Mr. Zoller the same as rendered by independent brokers?' Mr. Polk was not permitted
to answer this question.
"'As a matter of sound merchandising policy, was the value in dollars and cents of the services
rendered by Mr. Zoller the same as that of independent brokers?' Mr. Feldman asked.
'Yes,' replied Mr. Polk."
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matter, frequently is forced to straddle. Perhaps most of his merchandise still goes
through wholesalers and small independent retailers, but in view of the increasing
importance of chains he will cut himself off from too large a part of his consumer
market if he does not sell some of his goods through them; and, looking to the
future, he does not dare place sole reliance on a single channel of distribution which
may conceivably dwindle and dry up.
Among the earliest straddles of this type were those made by manufacturers who
decided to sell part of their output directly to retailers while continuing to sell the
rest -of it through wholesalers. The trade discount was the characteristic pricing
device used- to meet the requirements of this situation. The trade, or functional,
discount is a percentage reduction from a list price offered to a particular classifica-
tion of customers and differing from the percentage reduction granted to some other
classification of customers. For instance, if the list price is the suggested resale price
to consumers, a discount of 33%% may be accorded to retailers making direct pur-
chases and a discount of 33%a less an additional 20% may be given to wholesalers.
Trade discounts have no direct relation to the quantities involved; at times, for
instance, a wholesaler may place fill-in orders no larger than those typically received
by the manufacturer from retailers, but the wholesaler is nevertheless "protected" by
the trade discount. This pricing device has proved most useful in selecting customers
and shaping distribution policies.
The relation of trade discounts to costs is not a simple one. When wholesalers
are accorded a trade discount of 20% of their selling prices to retailers, the implica-
tion is that a 20% margin is sufficient to cover the operating costs of the wholesalers
and leave a net profit. This is an average mark-up which the wholesaler seeks to
obtain from as many manufacturers as possible, and in a competitive situation manu-
facturers who are seeking the services of this wholesaler to handle their products
are almost certain to be more strongly influenced in naming a rate of trade discount
by the general requirements of that particular class of wholesaler than by the sub-
stantially less tangible estimates of what it would cost them to do the same work.
This will surely be the case when, as often, the wholesaler, already carrying a wide
line of products, is in a stronger bargaining position than the manufacturer, seeking
outlets for his single line of merchandise.
Or consider the case of a shoe mahufacturer who, following the usual practice in
the shoe trade, sells direct toretailers and who wishes, for the sake of more complete
market coverage, to sell both to independent retailers and to department stores. The
department store is a different type of retail institution from the independent shoe
store, with a different organization, different methods of doing business, and con.
sequently a different cost of operation, a higher cost, as it happens. Therefore the
department store expects a higher trade discount, 'even though in the particular in-
stance the shoe manufacturer sends the same salesmen to call with about the same
frequency on both department stores and independent shoe stores. Thus a trade
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discount is a functional discount because it takes cognizance primarily of the costs
of the functions performed by the particular class of distributors to whom it is given.
The connection is closer with the costs of the buyer than with the costs of the seller.
In regard to the seller's situation, the trade discount is at best only a broadly gen-
eralized reflection of costs. In the individual instance, if a retailer and a wholesaler
should each place an order at the same time with a manufacturer for a carload of
the same product, consequent upon a single call by a salesman, it would be difficult
indeed to detect any difference in the manufacturer's costs with respect to the two
orders. Over a period of time, however, it certainly would cost the manufacturer
more to sell to retailers than to sell to wholesalers. He would have to carry larger
stocks, send out a greatly augmented salesforce to make more frequent calls on a
much larger number of customers, give more dealer helps, ship in smaller quantities,
possibly provide local distribution points, and so on. These additions to the manu-
facturer's marketing costs might be approximately the same as the wholesaler's
costs; they might be less; or they might be more. A manufacturer of a single line
of products of relatively low unit value commonly is at a serious disadvantage if he
tries to do his own wholesaling over any extensive territbry; his costs will be far
greater than those of a wholesaler who is able to spread his costs, particularly his
salesforce expense, over a large number of items. This is a common situation in
the grocery, drug, and hardware businesses. Where the unit of sale is larger, or the
manufacturer's line of products more extensive, no great disparity may exist between
the costs of independent wholesalers and those of manufacturers' wholesale branches;
and where, in addition to these conditions, specialized knowledge or technique is
required, a manufacturer may be able to apply these to the performance of his own
wholesale function with resulting lower costs than might be incurred by an inde-
pendent wholesaler.
A trade discount, of course, does not merely cover the buyer's costs. Ordinarily
there is some allowance for profit. How large this allowance shall be depends partly
on the policy and needs of the seller. A manufacturer may desire to build up- his
distribution through certain trade channels and consequently may offer (indeed
may find it necessary to offer) a large profit margin in his trade discount in order
to induce these particular middlemen to handle his product. Similarly he may wish
to make a large profit allowance to encourage distributors to devote more promo-
tional efforts to his product. On the other hand, a manufacturer may be in the
process of shifting his distribution channels and have a desire gradually to reduce
the proportion of his goods going to a certain class of middlemen. Hence he may
lower the trade discount accorded to this group.
Even if there could be shown a stronger thread of economic connection between
trade discounts and sellers' costs, it is doubtful whether differences in these costs are
of that tangible character envisaged by the Robinson-Patman Act as suitable justifica-
tion for price differentials. A manufacturer selling part of his output to wholesalers,
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part to chain stores, and part directly to independent retailers, and granting different
trade discounts to each, presumably has different costs for each of these channels;
but these are difficult to segregate and apportion. Sales to the chain stores may be
made on an annual contract basis; and to arrange these contracts may require two
weeks' time of one of the most important executives in the company. How much
is the selling expense? Sales to the wholesalers and independent retailers may be
made in part by the same force of salesmen, some of whom also may call occasionally
on the individual stores of chains to check on the movement of the company's
product. How is the salesforce pay roll and traveling expense to be allocated?
Perhaps, in the future, distribution cost accounting will be improved to a point
where better answers to these questions are possible; but in the past both the expense
of such refinements in accounting and doubt as to the utility of the information for
management purposes have been deterring factors. This constitutes an additional
reason why trade discounts have exhibited a much more nearly traceable relation to
buyers' costs than to sellers' costs.
The trade discount is an effective pricing device so long as a manufacturer is
dealing with only two or three simple classifications of customers, each performing
a substantially homogeneous group of marketing functions. But the extent of thie
shifts and realignments appearing in marketing functions and the consequent break-
down of many of the strictly institutional categories have created numerous situations
in which segregation of customers into a few classifications for pricing purposes is
not sufficient. There are too many different problems, too many different combina-
tions of functions-perhaps for some manufacturers almost as many different com-
binations of functions as there are customers. Not even two large chains in the
same line of business, for instance, necessarily perform the same distributive func-
tions. One of them may receive all purchases of merchandise from manufacturers
in large shipments at central warehouses where the merchandise is carried in stock
for subsequent shipment to the stores; whereas the other may carry reserve stocks
primarily at its stores and consequently require the manufacturer to make shipments
in smaller quantities to the individual stores. Such differences in functions lead
naturally to price differentials. Hence an important reason for the increase in so-
called price discrimination in recent years is to be found in the difficulty of adjusting
trade discount classifications to a manifold variety of combinations of marketing
functions. Too many special situations have arisen which could not be fitted into
a preconceived schedule of trade discounts. If in the future a manufacturer seeks
to use trade discounts in place of the out-and-out varying price policy which is
clearly banned by the Robinson-Patman Act, he presumably will find it desirable
not to establish too elaborate a set of customer classifications, if there is any way by
which it can be avoided.
But are trade discounts still permitted under the Act? This is a point on which
there is difference of opinion. Trade or functional discounts are not specifically
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mentioned in the Act. Therefore, some commentators have held that the situation
with respect to such discounts is no different from what it was under the Clayton
Act prior to the passage of the Robinson-Patman Act. Old Section 2 of the Clayton
Act was silent on the matter of trade discounts. The Federal Trade Commission
in the well-known case of the Mennen Company 9 ordered the latter to "Cease and
Desist from discriminating in net selling prices, by any method or device, between
purchasers of the same grade, quality or quantity of commodities, upon the 'basis of
a classification of its customers as 'jobbers,' 'wholesalers,' or 'retailers,' or any similar
classification which relates to the customers' form of organization, business policy,
business methods, or to the business of the customers' membership or shareholders,
in any transaction in, or directly affecting interstate commerce, in the distribution
of its products. . . ." If this order had been sustained, the practice of using trade
discounts would have been ended as contrary to the proyisions of the Clayton Act.
The Circuit Court of Appeals of the New York District reversed the Commission's
order in this case, " but on different grounds, namely, that the practice of the
Mennen Company was not unfair competition under the Clayton Act because it
did not injure any competitor of the Mennen Company. The Supreme Court re-
fused to review this decision. 21  Later, however, the Supreme Court in another
case 22 essentially overruled the grounds of the lower court's decision in the Mennen
case. In none of these decisions, however, did a court pass judgment on the specific
contention of the Federal Trade Commission that trade discounts were outlawed
under the Clayton Act. Therefore the use of such discounts has continued; and
it is argued that the Robinson-Patman Act, since it omits any mention of trade
discounts, does not alter the situation which has existed for so many years under
the Clayton Act.
But there is one circumstance which casts doubt on this conclusion. The Robin-
son-Patman Bill as reported out of the House Judiciary Committee included the
following proviso:
Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent or require differentials as be-
tween purchasers depending solely upon whether they purchase for resale to wholesalers,
to retailers, or to consumers, or for use in further manufacture; for the purpose of such
classification of 'customers as wholesalers or jobbers or retailers the character of the selling
of the purchaser and not the buying shall determine the classification, and any purchaser
who, directly or indirectly, through a subsidiary or affiliated concern or brokers, does both
a wholesale and retail business shall, irrespective of quantity purchased, be classified:
(x) As a wholesaler on purchases for sale to retail dealers only, not owned or controlled,
directly or indirectly, by the purchaser, and (2) As a retailer on purchases for sale to
consumers.
The purpose of this proviso evidently was to permit trade discounts applying to
wholesalers and jobbers, but to force. chains to be classified as retailers (a thoroughly
'F. T. C. Docket No. 6o6. 'Menen Co. v. F. T. C., 288 Fed. 774 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923).
"Id., cert. denied, 262 U. S. 759 (x923).
Geo. Vari Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can CO., 278 U. S. 245 (1929).
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unrealistic and unsound limitation, which reveals the animus behind the whole
measure) and to establish a dual classification for concerns engaged both in whole-
sale and in retail business. In the Act as finally passed this proviso was dropped out
entirely; and one plausible view of this omission is that Congress desired to take a
stand similar to that of the Federal Trade Commission in its order on the Mennen
case and close the door entirely to price differentials based on customer classifications
(unless, of course, these price differentials were of such a character as not to fall
under the express prohibitions of this section of the Act, i.e., not on commodities of
like grade and quality; not in interstate commerce; not having the effect of sub-
stantially lessening competition, tending to create a monopoly, or injuring, destroy-
ing, or preventing competition with any person, etc.). It is of course possible that
the courts in their interpretation of the Robinson-Patman Act will nevertheless
"read in" permission to give trade discounts, but there seems to be little doubt that
the sponsors of the measure desired to have this door closed.
If the door is closed to trade discounts as such, any price differentials as between
different classes of customers, provided they fall within the purview of the Act,
seemingly would have to be justified either on the basis of differences in the seller's
costs or on the basis of lack of competition between the two types of customers
concerned and the consequent impossibility of discrimination. As indicated in the
foregoing discussion, the first of these bases is not very satisfactory, since trade or
functional discounts are likely to bear so much closer relation to the buyer's costs
than to the seller's costs; and in any event tangible differences are difficult to de-
termine. The existence of competition or lack of competition is also an unsatisfac-
tory criterion. In the first place there is the uncertainty of application. Who are
competitors? Is there more, or less, competition between a retail clothing store in
New York City and a retail clothing store in Philadelphia than between a wholesale
grocer in New York and a retail grocer in the same city? Is a wholesale grocer in
competition with a grocery chain, such as the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,
which performs both wholesale and retail functions? Is a retailer of one type who
handles a very small quantity of a certain product as a side line in competition with
a retailer of quite another type who specializes primarily in that commodity? 28
And then there are all the situations in which a wholesaler carries on a small retail
business, and those in which a retailer similarly engages in occasional .wholesale
transactions. Even more serious is the difficulty that in many instances a manufac-
turer, in order to cover his market, definitely wishes to sell to several different types
of distributors who undeniably are in competition but who nevertheless perform
different groups of functions and have different costs. A food manufacturer may
The length to which it is possible to go in pursuit of the idea of protecting competition (really
meaning thereby the protection of competitors) is illustrated by the measures proposed from time to time
in state legislatures to forbid drug stores, department stores, and variety stores to operate luncheonettes.
A temporary high water mark in proposals of this general type is represented by the bill introduced into
the New York legislature last year providing that the handling of each classification of merchandise in a
retail establishment be conducted as a wholly separate business, with a separate entrance from the street.
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seek to sell not only to wholesalers but also to independent retail grocers, to chain
grocery stores, to department stores, and to supermarkets. In a world in which the
importance of distribution is increasing, and the shifts and changes in the grouping
of marketing functions are continually producing new merchandising combinations,
absence of competition is scarcely a satisfactory basis for price differentials designed
to compensate for differences in distributive functions. In practice trade discounts
fell far short of meeting the requirements of the situation; but even these seem to
have come under the ban of the Robinson-Patman Act, unless the courts assume
considerable leeway in interpretation.
So, even if there were no other grounds for dissent, the philosophy of the Robin-
son-Patman Act is fundamentally incompatible with a realistic functional view of
the marketing process. With no denial that there have been many abuses and cases
of injustice in connection with pricing policies and practices, it is still true that the
complex and dynamic character of the marketing process demands many price
differentials of types condemned under the Act as discriminatory, unless, indeed,
we are prepared to accept the idea that competition is an out-moded principle in
marketing. But if this be not the case, and yet if the social situation is deemed to
be such as to warrant some general law of this type remaining on the statute books,
there at least should be some express provision for price differentials based on trade
or functional classifications. It may well be that the concept of unfair corppetition
ought to be broadened, but cost is not a workable criterion from the standpoint of
either economics or marketing.
If the Robinson-Patman Act is not amended, or is not considerably modified in
the process of court interpretation, and if it is rigorously enforced, there will be a
tendency towards decline in the number and extent of price differentials, because
of the difficulty encountered in justifying them on the basis of tangible differences
in accounting costs. There will probably also be some tendency towards simplifica-
tion of distribution channels, probably in two directions. In the functional changes
that have been taking place in the marketing field it is possible to trace two general
patterns. The first of these, "manufacturer merchandising," is the situation in which
a manufacturer clearly takes the product responsibility; he does the designing, trade-
marks the goods, assumes the sales promotion task, exercises usually some choice
over the selection of retail outlets, and probably maintains or suggests or at least
advertises a resale price. The second pattern, "retailer merchandising," is the situa-
tion where a retailer takes the product responsilility; he determines what goods are
to be offered; perhaps he designs them; he owns the trade-mark and undertakes the
promotional task; possibly he buys the raw materials; he may even exercise virtual
control over the manufacturer, or perhaps this year he contracts with one manufac-
turer to make the goods, next year with another. Under price control legislation
of the Robinson-Patman type, changes in distribution channels are likely to result
in these two patterns becoming more sharply defined. In some instances such a
